

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 YAOUND 03053 221046Z
ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 INR-10 NSCE-00 SSO-00
INRE-00 /038 W

-----018672 221137Z /12-S

O 220900Z JUN 78
FM AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5840

S E C R E T YAOUNDE 3053

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: CF, XA, XJ
SUBJ: SOUTHERN AFRICAN POLICY: SHABA, SOVIET/CUBAN INVOLVEMENT

REF: (A) STATE 153145, (B) STATE 155147

1. I AM CURRENTLY AWAITING APPOINTMENT WITH CHIEF OF STATE; WILL
EXPLORE YOUNG PROPOSAL REFTEL A, PARAGRAPH 2 ABC. PRESIDENT AHIDJO
SHOULD BE ADDED TO LIST IN PARAGRAPH 2F.

2. CONSULTATIONS SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO MODERATE LEADERS. A
RANGE OF AFRICAN, LEADERSHIP MIGHT BE HELPED TO UNDERSTAND
THE DANGERS OF ACTING IN RESPONSE TO SHORT-TERM POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, AND/OR MILITARY PRESSURES. IT WILL TAKE TIME TO BUILD
A BROAD CONSENSUS, AND WE ARE ALREADY BEHIND SCHEDULE IN THE
EFFORT TO DO SO. WHY NOT IDENTIFY AFRICAN LEADERS WHO HAVE SOME
AMBIVALENCE TOWARD SOVIET/CUBAN ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA AND OPEN
DIALOG WITH THEM ON THE RATIONALE FOR CONTROL OF OUTSIDE
INFLUENCES IN AFRICA? PROPERLY DONE, IT COULD INDUCE SOME
DOCTRINAIRE SPOKESMEN TO EXAMINE PROBLEMS CREATED WHEN LONG-
TERM PRINCIPLES (E.G., INTEGRITY OF BORDERS) ARE SACRIFICED FOR
SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES (E.G., REDUCING UNREST).

3. PROJECTED STUDY COULD IDENTIFY LEADERS WHO HAVE COMPROMISED
PRINCIPLE AND WHO ARE POTENTIALLY UNEASY WITH SOME OF THE
CONSEQUENCES. STUDY MIGHT INCLUDE ANALYSIS OF KINDS OF ACTIONS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 YAOUND 03053 221046Z

WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN WITH RELATIVE UNANIMITY IN OAU AND THEIR
SUCCESS OR FAILURE IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN ANY RELEVANCE FOR THE
PRESENT SITUATION.

4. I HAVE SOME DISCOMFORT THAT THE WORDING OF PARAGRAPH 2A
AND B IN REFTEL A MIGHT BE MISINTERPRETED TO SUGGEST THE US
WISHES TO TEACH AFRICANS WHAT IS IN THEIR INTEREST AND THAT WE

HAVE LOST FAITH IN OAU. ON THE CONTRARY, WE SUPPORT OAU AND ENCOURAGE IT TO EXTEND ITS ACTIVITIES. PERHAPS OAU HAS FAILED US MORE THAN IT HAS AFRICA; IT HAS AT LEAST PROVIDED A FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION. HOWEVER, LIKE UN, THE OAU MIRRORS ITS MEMBERS AND THE REFLECTION IS ONE OF CLEAVAGE BETWEEN PROGRESSIVE AND MODERATE STATES, WITH EFFORTS TO BRIDGE THE GAP AWKWARD AND LARGELY INEFFECTIVE. ISSUES RAISED BY SHABA II AND REFTEL A MAY ONLY DEEPEN THIS SPLIT AND FURTHER REDUCE THE POTENTIAL FOR RESOLUTION. SINCE MUCH OF PROBLEM INVOLVES POWERS EXTERNAL TO AFRICA, SUCH AS SOVIET UNION, WARSAW PACT AND CUBA ON ONE HAND AN US AND NATO MEMBERS ON THE OTHER, IS THERE NOT A PROPER ROLE FOR UN TO PLAY AFTER OAU HAS DISCUSSED AND REFERRED TOPIC TO UN?

5. I AM ALSO UNCOMFORTABLE WITH PROMINENCE GIVEN NIGERIA IN OUR PROPOSALS, IN VIEW OF AFRICAN APPREHENSIONS REGARDING NIGERIA'S SIZE AND POWER; WOULD ADVISE CAREFUL BALANCING OF REFERENCES TO SPECIFIC AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND LEADERS. CAMEROON'S AHIDJO IS PRIME CANDIDATE FOR CONSULTATION. WHEN, PRIOR TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S VISIT TO AFRICA, DEPARTMENT REQUESTED US TO ASK IF HOST COUNTRY CONSIDERS OBASANJO TO BE SPOKESMAN FOR AFRICA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL IN PRESIDENCY SAID, IN EFFECT, NO SINGLE LEADER SPEAKS FOR ALL OF AFRICA AND WE SHOULD CONSULT WITH ALL LEADERS IF WE WISHED TO OBTAIN AFRICAN VIEWPOINT. THEREFORE, WHILE I AM SURE AHIDJO WOULD SUBSCRIBE TO MANY OF THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY SENGHOR CONCERNING SOVIET/ CUBAN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 YAOUND 03053 221046Z

ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA (REFTEL B), I AM EQUALLY SURE THAT AHIDJO WOULD NOT AGREE THAT SENGHOR OR ANYONE ELSE SPEAKS FOR CAMEROON.

6. COMMENT: UNFORTUNATELY THERE ARE NO QUICK ANSWERS TO LONG-TERM PROBLEMS CONFRONTING OAU. WITH PATIENCE AND PERSISTENCE WE CAN GET BEYOND REACTIVE POLICIES AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT. THEREFORE WE URGE THAT CONSULTATIONS BE VIEWED AS FIRST STEP IN DEVELOPING LONG-TERM PROCESS BY WHICH OUR STRATEGY AND THOSE OF OUR AFRICAN FRIENDS INCREASINGLY REFLECT THE MUTUALITY OF OUR OBJECTIVES AND INTERESTS.
SMYTHE

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, POLICIES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 22 jun 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978YAOUND03053
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780260-0583
Format: TEL
From: YAOUNDE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780628/aaaaaygs.tel
Line Count: 105
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: fa0b1b83-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION AF
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 2
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 STATE 153145, 78 STATE 155147
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 26 jul 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2235091
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SOUTHERN AFRICAN POLICY: SHABA, SOVIET/CUBAN INVOLVEMENT
TAGS: MPOL, PEPR, CF, XA, XJ, CU, UR
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/fa0b1b83-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014